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disperse within ten minutes after they had been ordered to do so by a justice of peace, were to be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for a period up to 12 months.
Besides the above, the Order in Council imposed restrictions on the movements of the apprentices. An apprentice was permitted to move about without a pass within a radius of five miles from his legal residence. An apprentice found beyond the permitted limits could, on conviction by a special justice, be punished as a "vagabond," unless he could prove to the satisfaction of the judge that he was on his way to or from public worship; and the only way he could satisfy the judge was to produce a pass issued by his master or by a judge in his district.
Compared to the penalties imposed on the apprentices, the masters suffered only slight penalties for not fulfilling their responsibilities towards their apprentices. A master who fraudulently or forcefully prolonged the weekly services of his praedial laborers was required, on conviction, to pay each laborer one shilling for every hour that the laborer worked in excess of the stipulated number of hours. An employer could be ordered by the special justice in his district to pay wages due to the apprentices for contracted taskwork or for extra services rendered. If the amount owed was not paid within one week of the issue of the order, the justice could order the attachment of that master's produce, utensils or some other property on his plantation. The judge could also impose a fine of up to five pounds sterling on an employer or his authorized agent for flogging, imprisoning or confining in the stocks or otherwise maltreating his workers.
Lastly, to ensure the smooth working of the apprenticeship system the Order in Council provided for the appointment of special judges or magistrates who would be paid and controlled by the British Government. Most of the nine districts of Mauritius were subdivided to make the administration of the apprenticeship law easier; a special judge or magistrate was appointed to each district or subdivision. In the year 1837, there were altogether 16 magistrates (PRO, C.O. 167/201, Nicolay to Glenelg, 31 January 1838).
THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE
The actual working of the apprenticeship system was affected by a number of factors. Besides the legal framework provided by the apprenticeship law, there were such variables as the differing needs, and the temperament and attitudes of the proprietary class and the apprentice class. The former was not a homogenous group. It included whites (French Creoles and a few Britons) and "Free Persons of Color" (persons of mixed black and white or Indian ancestry). Large planters had several scores of apprentices; other persons had only a few (apprentices). Their needs, interests and temperament varied, and all affected the actual working of the apprenticeship system. The apprentices numbered 61,045 in 1835 (Mauritius, Central Statistical Office, 1955: 3). They differed greatly in such matters as working abilities, temperament and habits. The justices themselves were not an undifferentiated lot. Whereas some of them discharged their duties conscientiously, others did not. In spite of these differences, it is possible to discern dominant concerns among each group. For the planters, the dominant and consuming concern during and after the period of the apprenticeship system was the availability of ample, steady, and pliable labor to meet the needs of an agricultural economy based increasingly on sugar production and exports. The labor needs of the planters may be illustrated by the fact that the sugar output was less than one million pounds in 1812 but more than 60 million pounds in 1830 (Pridham, 1946: 375) .
As the sugar industry was still labor-intensive, it was in the interest of the planters to work their apprentices hard in order to maintain the high level of output. For the apprentices, the foremost wish was the attainment of full, unfettered freedom. By the nature of their appointment, the justices' common concern was to administer and uphold the apprenticeship law. The role of these three groups will now be discussed.
The planters tried various methods to increase the amount of labor they extracted from apprentices. One method was to add Saturday to the working week. Some planters behaved like one master in the Black River District, who threatened to deny his apprenticed workers the privilege of gathering fruits and vegetables from his estates if they refused to work for him on Saturdays, and also to deny them the privilege of keeping their pigs and poultry on his plantations and might even order them to sell the ones that they already had ( emerging from a state of servitude to one of freedom; second, to remedy the insufficiency of the existing laws to compel the lower classes to work in the interest of agriculture and industry, and to protect "mutual" interests. The ordinance provided for compulsory census of all persons not subject to the Act for the Abolition of Slavery in the British Empire. All persons who failed to declare to the census officers their names, ages, places of birth and last residence, and occupations were liable to pay a fine of up to two pounds sterling. The ordinance equated unemployment with "vagrancy" and punished it as such. All adult, able-bodied persons without employment or "recognized" means of subsistence were placed under the supervision of the police. "Vagrants" who broke police regulations were to be imprisoned for as many as three months for the first offense, and one year for a repetition of the offense. All adult "vagrants" under 60 years of age were required to find jobs within a stipulated time. If they failed to find work, the state was entitled to employ them on public works for its own benefit. If they failed, while working for the state, to secure employment within three months, they were liable to be sentenced to work on the plantations or in manufacturing establishments for a period not exceeding three years. The Courts of First Instance, as the lower courts were called, were empowered to issue sentences that might be appealed within eight days. If the worker serving the three-year sentence was not able to secure a job by the end of that period, he was to be subjected to "a new engagement in the same manner as before" (PRO, C.O. 169/2).
Ordinance No. 16 of 1835 required workers or apprentices employed for a period exceeding a month to register their names on official registers kept either in the registry office in Port Louis or in the district registry offices. A person who did not register his name had to pay a fine not exceeding one pound sterling, or go to jail for as many as three days. Persons who registered their names were given tickets showing their names, places of birth, occupation and marital status. Tickets were to be renewed each time that the bearers changed their employers; if they failed to do so they could be imprisoned for eight days. Employers hiring workers without tickets were liable to pay a fine not exceeding ten pounds sterling. Lastly, the ordinance imposed "appropriate" sanctions for the slightest breach of contracts, threats or "conspiracies" on the part of the workers. For example, if three or more employees "conspired" to quit or neglect their work, change their conditions of service or secure an increase in wages, they could be sentenced to up to six months imprisonment (PRO, C.O. 169/2).
Ordinance No. 16 of 1835 was put in force until the pleasure of the British Crown could be ascertained. Unfortunately for the planters and other employers of labor, the Crown disallowed the ordinance on the ground that it imposed unnecessary burdensome restraints on the labor of freemen. Similarly, a companion piece of legislation, Ordinance No. 17 of 1835, was disallowed. The news of the disallowance reached Mauritius several months after the ordinances had been in operation (in those days, dispatches from Mauritius to Britain and vice versa took several months to reach their destination). The news caused considerable disquietude. Planters and officials alike were very much disappointed. On 25 July 1836, Governor Nicolay wrote a dispatch to the secretary of state for the colonies, pointing out that the restraints imposed by Ordinance No. 16 of 1835 "are not in general" as heavy as the restraints imposed by special laws regulating the relations between masters and servants in places other than Mauritius. He said that the regulations contained in the ordinance "have already produced a good practical effect, without any manifestation of discontent, or complaint of oppression" (PRO, C.O. 167/190, Nicolay to Glenelg, 25 July 1936). Six months later he wrote that the disallowance had excited among the "inhabitants at large . . . a considerable degree of alarm." In two districts, planters had asked the governor for permission to hold public meetings to draw up memorials protesting against the disallowance. The governor said that more requests to hold public meetings for the same purpose would have followed if he had not refused to sanction any public meetings for the purpose indicated. He added that since the news of the disallowance became public, there had been "a visible increase of idleness and disorder among the lower classes" (PRO, C.O. 167/196, Nicolay to Glenelg, 21 January 1837).
The "idlers" and "disorderly" persons who reveled in the Crown's disallowance of Ordinance No. 16 of 1835 included the black "apprentices." The latter viewed the apprenticeship system as renovated slavery. As slaves, their masters possessed their persons and their services; as "apprentices," they were "personally free" but their masters owned their services. As slaves, they could be bought and sold; as "apprentices," they could no longer be sold individually, but they could be sold as integral parts of their masters' estates. In fact, one of the reasons why the planters opposed the "premature" termination of praedial apprenticeship in 1839 was the fact that many estates had been bought and sold on the assumption that the apprenticeship system would run its full course (PRO, C.O. 167/205, Nicolay to Glenelg, 10 December 1838). As slaves, the apprentices were flogged by their masters for offenses detailed or unstipulated by the slave laws; as "apprentices," they received, for diverse offenses, punishments (including flogging) ordered by the special justices, although the latter sometimes intervened on their behalf. As slaves, they could purchase their freedom with their savings; as "apprentices," those who could afford it purchased their freedom "at enormous prices," as one resident Briton (Baker, 1838) put it, "as if no act of emancipation existed."
The functioning of the apprenticeship system, as far as the black apprentices were concerned, was affected by all of these factors. If the apprentices shared a common evaluation of their status, however, they responded to it differently. Some of them worked very hard in their spare time to accumulate enough money to buy their freedom. In the Grand Port District, for example, 138 apprentices paid ?1,7 36 and 8 shillings for their freedom between 1 April 1837 and 1 February 1839. In the colony as a whole, several thousand apprentices bought their freedom between February 1835 and February 1839 (A and P, 1847, vol. 39, number 325: 256-58, 261). It is said that some of tl -apprentices who had purchased their freedom would come to the unliberated apprentices to show off their shoes-as neither the slaves nor the apprentices were allowed to wear shoes-as marks of their free status (Blackhouse, 1838). The apprentices who could not buy their freedom numbered in several scores of thousands. The apprentices as a whole discharged their duties generally in two ways. Some of them worked as best they could, occasionally receiving commendation for work well done or punishments for their transgressions; many of them rarely complained to the special magistrates about the wrongs that their masters had done to them. They failed to complain, not because the special magistrates were inaccessible-in fact, some of the magistrates did their best to protect them from grave ill-treatment-but because they feared that they might not receive justice at the hands of the magistrates, men with whom their masters socialized in the rural isolated districts. As some of them put it, making their grievances known to the special magistrates "would only make the situation of ourselves and our children worse; and, in a few years, we shall be free" (PRO, C.O. 167/208, Blackhouse to Buxton, 14 May 1838).
The other category of apprentices discounted submission and silent suffering in favor of militancy. They considered criminal acts and "criminal protests" as more effective means of fighting an exploitative system. Their chief instruments were stealing, "drunkenness," insubordination, mutilation of farm animals, lateness for work and, above all, marooning (running away). For these offenses the criminal elements and the "criminal protesters" drew upon themselves the anger of their masters and earned the penal sanctions imposed by the special magistrates.
The judicial decisions and the attitudes of the special magistrates greatly influenced the character and working of the apprenticeship system. "By their exertions," as one of them (PRO, C.O. 167/196, Anderson to Glenelg, 1 February 1837) put it, "the apprentice is compelled to perform the work to which his employer is entitled ...."
This compulsion made it difficult for them to win the confidence of the apprentices, and to assure the latter that they could receive justice. On the other hand, it was the duty of the special magistrates to make sure that the master-employers fulfilled their obligations towards their apprentices. The relatively high incidence of punishments aroused the concern of Lord Glenelg, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He wrote a dispatch to Governor Nicolay, asking him to call the attention of the special magistrates to "the frequency of punishments generally and particularly to those of a corporal nature, which are stated to be far beyond the proportion in the West Indies of a nearly similar extent of population." He expressed the wish "that the Magistrates should consider whether some other mode of punishment could not be advantageously substituted for whipping and whether corporal punishments might not be rendered more efficacious by being resorted to less indiscriminately." On the receipt of Glenelg's dispatch, Nicolay directed the colonial secretary (chief secretary) of Mauritius to send circular letters to the special magistrates on the subject of Glenelg's dispatch. The special magistrates were requested to explain the probable primary causes of the offenses for which the apprentices were punished, and to suggest the best means of preventing and ultimately stopping them (PRO, C.O. 167/201, Nicolay to Glenelg, 31 January 1838).
Most of the reports of the special magistrates were in agreement in attributing the major causes of the crimes and offenses for which the apprentices received punishments to the apprentices themselves. Special Magistrate C. Anderson of Port Louis District (PRO, C.O. 167/201, Anderson to Dick, 21 September 1837) acknowledged that the "capricious and vexatious although not illegal conduct of employers" frequently drove the apprentices to "acts of desperation" which brought punishment to the apprentices, but he also ascribed the causes of the crimes committed to the deep-rooted and demoralizing habits formed by persons reaching manhood and old age in slavery, and "to whom religion and morality and Since most of the special magistrates were firmly convinced that the black apprentices were by nature prone to committing crimes, and that only severity would compel them to stop marooning as well as committing other offenses, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the punishments given to the offending apprentices reflected, besides confirming the officially prescribed battery of punishments, the biased attitudes of the special magistrates. Fortunately for the apprentices, they were spared from experiencing a more drastic penal regime by external events that they had hardly anticipated.
THE SYSTEM ABORTED
Following the examples of Antigua and Barbados, the British West Indies Islands liberated their "apprentices" in 1838. In Mauritius, the domestics were due to be freed on 1 February 1839, but praedial apprenticeship was not due to expire until 1 February 1841. As a result of the events in the West Indies, it was feared that it would be difficult to compel the praedials to work after the domestics had been freed. Consequently, the secretary of state wrote a dispatch to Governor Nicolay on 11 July 1838, recommending the "immediate and entire liberation" of the The final discussion of the matter took place in the meeting held on 21 November 1838, after which the following resolution was passed by a majority of one vote:
The Council recognizes that its constitution does not give it the power to decide by a legislative enactment a question of so much importance, and which affects so numerous private interests, regulated and guaranteed, moreover, by an Act of Parliament.
Neither does the constitution of the Council authorize it to express the wishes of the inhabitants, whose concurrence and consent only could warrant a change in the provisions of the Act which has established the conditions of emancipation.
But if the Council were to give an opinion on the subject, it would be that, notwithstanding the disposition which the inhabitants may feel to enter into the views of an early liberation, the most serious motives would render the execution of that disposition, in the present circumstances of the colony, extremely difficult, and dangerous alike for public order and tranquility, and the welfare of all classes of the population ( Even where some planters evinced a desire to receive the ex-apprentices back on the plantations as workers, the rigors of the apprenticeship system were such that the blacks could not endure contract labor which they equated with slavery. Going back to the plantations was thought to be equivalent, as Patrick Beaton (1971: 88) aptly put it to "a galley slave resuming the oar, when told that he was free." Neither planter nor ex-apprentice was, for different reasons, interested in forging fruitful relations with the other.
The relations between the planters and the Indian laborers were generally bad. Heavy fines were imposed on them for their absences from work. "The heaviest fine," was, as Barnwell The "apprenticeship" system in Mauritius was of short duration, lasting just four years, but its direct and indirect results were felt for several decades by the country's multiracial society.
